BrightView Holdings

BVNYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

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$9.87
−$1.56 (−13.65%)Today 1M +7.12%
After hours$9.86−0.10%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$11.43
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$9.52–$10.48
Regular-session low and high so far today.
3.3M
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Feb 2 projected
Projected for 2027-02-02 from the company’s own results filings (SEC 8-K Item 2.02). The company has not confirmed the date.
$9.52–$15.00
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own BV if its national landscaping platform keeps converting a flat revenue base into cash and lower leverage, but the case is fragile because the service is labor-intensive, locally competitive, and not showing top-line momentum.

BV price history

Latest price$9.87Today−$1.56 (-13.65%)
BV -7.89%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

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Investment thesis

What must happen next

5 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Commercial property owners continue to outsource recurring exterior maintenance to a national provider, so BrightView can defend its revenue base even while cyclical project work and customer pruning pressure growth.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP annual revenue remained large at $2.673 billion in FY2025, evidence that BrightView still has a substantial service base. If the outsourcing relationship is resilient, revenue can provide a cash base; if customers rebid, insource, or cut property budgets, the platform loses operating leverage.

    Watch: Large property managers or national accounts shift bundled maintenance contracts to lower-cost regional contractors.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual revenue remained large at $2.673 billion in FY2025, evidence that BrightView still has a substantial service base.

    Open source ↗
  • BrightView's scale only has economic value if branch density, procurement, pricing, and labor scheduling offset wage, fuel, subcontractor, insurance, and weather-cost pressure; otherwise national scale is not a margin moat.HoldingMateriality: High

    GAAP annual gross profit was $621.7 million in FY2025, showing the company still earns a sizable spread over direct service costs. Stable gross economics would let cash flow compound; margin leakage would mean the company is buying or retaining work at poor returns.

    Watch: Local landscaping contractors underbid BrightView on renewals because customers prioritize price over national service breadth.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual gross profit was $621.7 million in FY2025, showing the company still earns a sizable spread over direct service.

    Open source ↗
  • Working-capital discipline and service-route operations continue to convert modest GAAP earnings into cash that can fund reinvestment and de-risk the balance sheet.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP annual operating cash flow rose from $106.9 million in FY2022 to $291.8 million in FY2025. Cash conversion is the bridge from a low-margin service business to equity value; if it reverses, deleveraging and reinvestment capacity weaken.

    Watch: Commercial customers stretch payment terms or dispute receivables, reversing working-capital benefits.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP annual operating cash flow rose from $106.9 million in FY2022 to $291.8 million in FY2025.

    Open source ↗
  • Management keeps using cash generation to reduce obligations rather than re-levering for uneconomic acquisitions, allowing more enterprise value to accrue to common equity holders.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    GAAP liabilities declined from $2.089 billion at FY2022 year-end to $1.592 billion at FY2025 year-end. Deleveraging can magnify equity value in a slow-growth business; renewed leverage without returns would transfer upside back to creditors and increase downside risk.

    Watch: BrightView resumes a debt-funded roll-up strategy at acquisition multiples that do not produce adequate route-density or procurement benefits.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP liabilities declined from $2.089 billion at FY2022 year-end to $1.592 billion at FY2025 year-end.

    Open source ↗
  • Because commercial landscaping is labor-intensive and locally competitive, per-share compounding depends more on cost discipline, mix quality, and debt reduction than on chasing low-margin volume.HoldingMateriality: Medium

    GAAP diluted EPS was positive in FY2024 at $0.20 and FY2025 at $0.13 after a GAAP diluted loss per share of $0.12 in FY2023. If management prioritizes profitable work, EPS can improve even in a slow-growth market; if it chases volume, owners may see weak or volatile per-share earnings.

    Watch: Development or enhancement work shifts toward lower-margin projects to fill crew capacity.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    GAAP diluted EPS was positive in FY2024 at $0.20 and FY2025 at $0.13 after a GAAP diluted loss per share.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Commercial property owners continue to outsource recurring exterior maintenance to a national provider, so BrightView can defend its revenue base even while cyclical project work and customer pruning pressure growth. If the outsourcing relationship is resilient, revenue can provide a cash base; if customers rebid, insource, or cut property budgets, the platform loses operating leverage.

BrightView's scale only has economic value if branch density, procurement, pricing, and labor scheduling offset wage, fuel, subcontractor, insurance, and weather-cost pressure; otherwise national scale is not a margin moat. Stable gross economics would let cash flow compound; margin leakage would mean the company is buying or retaining work at poor returns.

Working-capital discipline and service-route operations continue to convert modest GAAP earnings into cash that can fund reinvestment and de-risk the balance sheet. Cash conversion is the bridge from a low-margin service business to equity value; if it reverses, deleveraging and reinvestment capacity weaken.

Management keeps using cash generation to reduce obligations rather than re-levering for uneconomic acquisitions, allowing more enterprise value to accrue to common equity holders. Deleveraging can magnify equity value in a slow-growth business; renewed leverage without returns would transfer upside back to creditors and increase downside risk.

Because commercial landscaping is labor-intensive and locally competitive, per-share compounding depends more on cost discipline, mix quality, and debt reduction than on chasing low-margin volume. If management prioritizes profitable work, EPS can improve even in a slow-growth market; if it chases volume, owners may see weak or volatile per-share earnings.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its national landscaping platform keeps converting a flat revenue base into cash and lower leverage, but the case is fragile because the service is labor-intensive, locally competitive, and not showing top-line momentum.

Evidence assessed Oct 13, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for BrightView Holdings

Where the evidence on BrightView Holdings stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 13, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 2 strengthening and 3 holding.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Commercial property owners continue to outsource recurring exterior maintenance to a national provider, so BrightView can defend its revenue base even while cyclical project work and customer pruning pressure growth.

    sec.gov ↗

  • BrightView's scale only has economic value if branch density, procurement, pricing, and labor scheduling offset wage, fuel, subcontractor, insurance, and weather-cost pressure; otherwise national scale is not a margin moat.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Working-capital discipline and service-route operations continue to convert modest GAAP earnings into cash that can fund reinvestment and de-risk the balance sheet.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Management keeps using cash generation to reduce obligations rather than re-levering for uneconomic acquisitions, allowing more enterprise value to accrue to common equity holders.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Because commercial landscaping is labor-intensive and locally competitive, per-share compounding depends more on cost discipline, mix quality, and debt reduction than on chasing low-margin volume.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • Large property managers or national accounts shift bundled maintenance contracts to lower-cost regional contractors.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Local landscaping contractors underbid BrightView on renewals because customers prioritize price over national service breadth.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Commercial customers stretch payment terms or dispute receivables, reversing working-capital benefits.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · BrightView Holdings

12 mo agonow
Trailing daily price. No thesis break has crossed here, so there is no break base rate to project.

No break has crossed BrightView Holdings’s thesis. Its break conditions are checked against every new filing as it lands.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Reported results of operations (earnings release).

    BrightView Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-04: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    BrightView Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-06-18: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Entered a material definitive agreement.

    BrightView Holdings filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-05-05: Entered a material definitive agreement. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • Large property managers or national accounts shift bundled maintenance contracts to lower-cost regional contractors.
  • Local landscaping contractors underbid BrightView on renewals because customers prioritize price over national service breadth.
  • Commercial customers stretch payment terms or dispute receivables, reversing working-capital benefits.
  • BrightView resumes a debt-funded roll-up strategy at acquisition multiples that do not produce adequate route-density or procurement benefits.
  • Development or enhancement work shifts toward lower-margin projects to fill crew capacity.

BV news

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Financial statements

BV income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

BV: quick answers

When does BrightView Holdings (BV) report earnings next?
BrightView Holdings's next results are projected for February 2, 2027, from the dates of its own results filings with the SEC. The company has not confirmed the date. It last reported on November 10, 2026. Earnings calendar
What is BV's short interest?
As of October 30, 2026, 4.2M BV shares were sold short, 4.55% of its shares outstanding, down 0.1% from the count before. At the stock's average daily volume that is 5.6 days to cover. FINRA publishes the count twice a month. BV short interest history
Have members of Congress traded BV?
4 trades in BV have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed BV trade
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