Credicorp

BAPNYSEUSD

THESIS ALERT

Email me when the BAP thesis changes

Evidence-based analysis, not personalized investment advice. Every alert email carries an unsubscribe link.

Follow on X
$368.74
+$0.94 (+0.26%)Today 1M −3.52%
After hours$368.740.00%

Updated Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET · Regular session · May be delayed

Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
$367.80
Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
$362.58–$370.60
Regular-session low and high so far today.
589.9K
Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
Not yet confirmed
The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
$230.45–$413.25
52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.

Understand the Business

Why the Stock Moved

Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.

The core investment thesis

Own BAP if its Peru-centered universal-banking franchise keeps low-cost customer relationships, underwrites credit through the cycle, and converts scale into earnings rather than absorbing it in credit losses or fintech competition.

BAP price history

Latest price$368.74Today+$0.94 (+0.26%)
BAP -3.58%S&P 500 -2.42%Since first plotted close
4 hours

Loading recent earnings…

Investment thesis

What must happen next

4 MATERIAL PROPOSITIONS
  • Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    IFRS annual revenue increased from PEN 18.415 billion in FY2020 to PEN 27.472 billion in FY2024. If the relationship franchise holds, Credicorp can keep growing the top line from customer activity; if it weakens, growth would require price concessions or riskier credit.

    Watch: BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    IFRS annual revenue increased from PEN 18.415 billion in FY2020 to PEN 27.472 billion in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
  • Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle.StrengtheningMateriality: High

    IFRS annual net income recovered from PEN 334.1 million in FY2020 to PEN 5.623 billion in FY2024 after the pandemic shock. For a bank, revenue growth is valuable only if it survives credit costs; broken underwriting would turn apparent growth into capital destruction.

    Watch: A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    IFRS annual net income recovered from PEN 334.1 million in FY2020 to PEN 5.623 billion in FY2024 after the pandemic.

    Open source ↗
  • Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    Cash and cash equivalents were PEN 47.570 billion at FY2024, up from PEN 33.921 billion at FY2023. Bank franchises compound only while funding remains stable; a liquidity scare can destroy earnings power faster than an income statement shows.

    Watch: A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    Cash and cash equivalents were PEN 47.570 billion at FY2024, up from PEN 33.921 billion at FY2023.

    Open source ↗
  • Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium

    IFRS annual diluted EPS rose from PEN 44.99 in FY2021 to PEN 69.09 in FY2024. Owners ultimately need per-share compounding; a bank can grow assets and revenue while shareholders earn little if costs, credit losses, or dilution absorb the gains.

    Watch: Fintech, cybersecurity, and digital-transformation spending becomes a defensive cost merely to retain customers rather than a productivity lever.

    Supporting sources

    Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.

    IFRS annual diluted EPS rose from PEN 44.99 in FY2021 to PEN 69.09 in FY2024.

    Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence

Loading the original research archive…

Original research

Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing. If the relationship franchise holds, Credicorp can keep growing the top line from customer activity; if it weakens, growth would require price concessions or riskier credit.

Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle. For a bank, revenue growth is valuable only if it survives credit costs; broken underwriting would turn apparent growth into capital destruction.

Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage. Bank franchises compound only while funding remains stable; a liquidity scare can destroy earnings power faster than an income statement shows.

Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base. Owners ultimately need per-share compounding; a bank can grow assets and revenue while shareholders earn little if costs, credit losses, or dilution absorb the gains.

All standing thesis claims
Original report summary

its Peru-centered universal-banking franchise keeps low-cost customer relationships, underwrites credit through the cycle, and converts scale into earnings rather than absorbing it in credit losses or fintech competition.

Evidence assessed Oct 15, 2026. Expand each conclusion for its evidence and what would change it. Thesis evidence—not a buy or sell recommendation.

Bull case and bear case

Bull case and bear case for Credicorp

Where the evidence on Credicorp stands: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 4 strengthening.

Bull case: what the evidence supports

  • Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage.

    sec.gov ↗

  • Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base.

    sec.gov ↗

Bear case: what would count against it

  • BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.

    sec.gov ↗

  • A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.

    sec.gov ↗

  • A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.

    sec.gov ↗

Thesis-Break Engine

Thesis-break watch · Credicorp

Loading the break-condition record for Credicorp.

How the Thesis-Break Engine works →Historical outcomes are measured against the market after past breaks of the same kind, across all companies. Not a prediction.

MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT

The numbers behind the thesis

Sourced from filings and market data

What Changed

  1. Mixed
    Foreign issuer material report (6-K).

    Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-09-17: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  2. Mixed
    Foreign issuer material report (6-K).

    Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-08-17: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

  3. Mixed
    Foreign issuer material report (6-K).

    Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-06-24: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.

Risks / falsifiers

What could break the thesis

  • BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.
  • A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.
  • A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.
  • Fintech, cybersecurity, and digital-transformation spending becomes a defensive cost merely to retain customers rather than a productivity lever.

BAP news

Loading headlines…

Financial statements

BAP income statement

Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.

BAP: quick answers

Have members of Congress traded BAP?
4 trades in BAP have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed BAP trade
ScoutJUST THIS STORY

LET’S MAKE THIS USEFUL · 1 OF 5

How would you like me to explain this?

Tell me what you want from this read. Start with a quick note, then adjust the details. Your other stories stay as they are.

We’ll remember your view of this story. The published article stays unchanged.

THIS STORY’S READING VIEWStandard · The whole picture

Clear explanations with context. Both sides of the evidence.