Credicorp
BAPNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $367.80 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $362.58–$370.60 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 589.9K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $230.45–$413.25 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own BAP if its Peru-centered universal-banking franchise keeps low-cost customer relationships, underwrites credit through the cycle, and converts scale into earnings rather than absorbing it in credit losses or fintech competition.
BAP price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing.StrengtheningMateriality: High
IFRS annual revenue increased from PEN 18.415 billion in FY2020 to PEN 27.472 billion in FY2024. If the relationship franchise holds, Credicorp can keep growing the top line from customer activity; if it weakens, growth would require price concessions or riskier credit.
Watch: BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual revenue increased from PEN 18.415 billion in FY2020 to PEN 27.472 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle.StrengtheningMateriality: High
IFRS annual net income recovered from PEN 334.1 million in FY2020 to PEN 5.623 billion in FY2024 after the pandemic shock. For a bank, revenue growth is valuable only if it survives credit costs; broken underwriting would turn apparent growth into capital destruction.
Watch: A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual net income recovered from PEN 334.1 million in FY2020 to PEN 5.623 billion in FY2024 after the pandemic.
Open source ↗Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Cash and cash equivalents were PEN 47.570 billion at FY2024, up from PEN 33.921 billion at FY2023. Bank franchises compound only while funding remains stable; a liquidity scare can destroy earnings power faster than an income statement shows.
Watch: A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash and cash equivalents were PEN 47.570 billion at FY2024, up from PEN 33.921 billion at FY2023.
Open source ↗Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
IFRS annual diluted EPS rose from PEN 44.99 in FY2021 to PEN 69.09 in FY2024. Owners ultimately need per-share compounding; a bank can grow assets and revenue while shareholders earn little if costs, credit losses, or dilution absorb the gains.
Watch: Fintech, cybersecurity, and digital-transformation spending becomes a defensive cost merely to retain customers rather than a productivity lever.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
IFRS annual diluted EPS rose from PEN 44.99 in FY2021 to PEN 69.09 in FY2024.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing. If the relationship franchise holds, Credicorp can keep growing the top line from customer activity; if it weakens, growth would require price concessions or riskier credit.
Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle. For a bank, revenue growth is valuable only if it survives credit costs; broken underwriting would turn apparent growth into capital destruction.
Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage. Bank franchises compound only while funding remains stable; a liquidity scare can destroy earnings power faster than an income statement shows.
Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base. Owners ultimately need per-share compounding; a bank can grow assets and revenue while shareholders earn little if costs, credit losses, or dilution absorb the gains.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its Peru-centered universal-banking franchise keeps low-cost customer relationships, underwrites credit through the cycle, and converts scale into earnings rather than absorbing it in credit losses or fintech competition.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Credicorp
Where the evidence on Credicorp stands: Strengthening on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 4 thesis points, 4 strengthening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
Credicorp’s universal-banking customer relationships continue to pull deposits, loans, payments, and fee activity into the same franchise, so financial-service demand converts into revenue without requiring structurally worse pricing.
Credicorp’s credit culture and risk selection remain good enough that loan growth does not require accepting a structurally higher loss cycle.
Credicorp’s balance-sheet liquidity remains sufficient to preserve depositor and regulator trust during emerging-market volatility, protecting its funding advantage.
Credicorp’s scale and operating discipline continue to convert franchise earnings into per-share value rather than being consumed by dilution, restructuring, or a permanently higher cost base.
Bear case: what would count against it
BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.
A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.
A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Credicorp
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-09-17: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-08-17: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Credicorp filed an SEC report on 2026-06-24: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- BBVA Peru, Interbank, Scotiabank Peru, or other local banks begin winning primary-account relationships with materially better digital products or deposit pricing.
- A Peru recession, political shock, or severe weather event drives household, SME, or microfinance borrower stress before headline earnings deteriorate.
- A Peruvian sovereign downgrade, currency shock, or political crisis triggers deposit outflows or a shift into foreign-currency cash outside the banking system.
- Fintech, cybersecurity, and digital-transformation spending becomes a defensive cost merely to retain customers rather than a productivity lever.
BAP news
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Financial statements
BAP income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
BAP: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded BAP?
- 4 trades in BAP have been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed BAP trade
