Amber International Holding
AMBRNASDAQUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $1.75 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $1.59–$1.77 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 59.1K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $0.83–$3.16 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own AMBR if the Amber platform restores customer demand fast enough to convert strong gross economics into positive operating cash flow before dilution.
AMBR price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
AMBR’s new finance-services positioning must restore customer relevance after the iClick revenue collapse; without a real customer pull for the Amber platform, the company remains subscale.WeakeningMateriality: High
FY2024 annual GAAP revenue was $32.806 million, showing AMBR still has a commercial revenue base after the transition. If customer demand returns, the company has a base to rebuild from; if not, the current valuation is unsupported by the business.
Watch: Customers shift wallet to larger regulated banks, brokers, or crypto-native platforms instead of adopting AMBR’s finance-services offering.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2024 annual GAAP revenue was $32.806 million, showing AMBR still has a commercial revenue base after the transition.
Open source ↗The business only has attractive economics if AMBR’s services remain differentiated enough to earn fee or spread economics rather than being competed down to commodity execution pricing.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2024 annual GAAP gross_profit was $16.747 million on $32.806 million of revenue, an implied gross margin of about 51%. Sustained gross profit gives AMBR a chance to scale into profitability; gross-profit compression would make the turnaround much harder.
Watch: Large exchanges, brokers, or wealth platforms use scale to lower prices for execution, custody, or advisory services.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2024 annual GAAP gross_profit was $16.747 million on $32.806 million of revenue, an implied gross margin of about 51%.
Open source ↗AMBR must turn its gross-profit pool into operating leverage; otherwise the public-company, compliance, technology, and personnel cost base consumes the economics of the platform.WeakeningMateriality: Medium
FY2023 annual GAAP operating_income was a loss of $11.644 million, improved from a FY2022 annual GAAP operating loss of $24.290 million. Gross margins do not create shareholder value unless operating losses narrow as the business scales.
Watch: Compliance, licensing, and technology spending rises faster than revenue as AMBR builds the new finance-services platform.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2023 annual GAAP operating_income was a loss of $11.644 million, improved from a FY2022 annual GAAP operating loss of $24.290.
Open source ↗AMBR needs enough liquidity to fund the transition without distressed dilution, because persistent cash burn would transfer much of any future operating upside away from current holders.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Cash was $9.326 million at FY2024 year-end, up from $0.793 million at FY2023 year-end. The business can improve while the stock still disappoints if the turnaround is financed on punitive terms.
Watch: Operating cash burn continues before revenue accelerates, forcing equity issuance or expensive financing.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Cash was $9.326 million at FY2024 year-end, up from $0.793 million at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗Because AMBR operates in finance services, counterparty confidence is part of the product; the balance sheet must remain visibly solvent for customers to trust the platform.HoldingMateriality: Medium
Equity improved to $29.785 million at FY2024 year-end from negative $4.548 million at FY2023 year-end. A weakening balance sheet can damage customer adoption before it shows up fully in revenue.
Watch: Trading, credit, custody, or counterparty losses reduce reported equity.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Equity improved to $29.785 million at FY2024 year-end from negative $4.548 million at FY2023 year-end.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
AMBR’s new finance-services positioning must restore customer relevance after the iClick revenue collapse; without a real customer pull for the Amber platform, the company remains subscale. If customer demand returns, the company has a base to rebuild from; if not, the current valuation is unsupported by the business.
The business only has attractive economics if AMBR’s services remain differentiated enough to earn fee or spread economics rather than being competed down to commodity execution pricing. Sustained gross profit gives AMBR a chance to scale into profitability; gross-profit compression would make the turnaround much harder.
AMBR must turn its gross-profit pool into operating leverage; otherwise the public-company, compliance, technology, and personnel cost base consumes the economics of the platform. Gross margins do not create shareholder value unless operating losses narrow as the business scales.
AMBR needs enough liquidity to fund the transition without distressed dilution, because persistent cash burn would transfer much of any future operating upside away from current holders. The business can improve while the stock still disappoints if the turnaround is financed on punitive terms.
Because AMBR operates in finance services, counterparty confidence is part of the product; the balance sheet must remain visibly solvent for customers to trust the platform. A weakening balance sheet can damage customer adoption before it shows up fully in revenue.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
the Amber platform restores customer demand fast enough to convert strong gross economics into positive operating cash flow before dilution.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Amber International Holding
Where the evidence on Amber International Holding disagrees: Mixed on the latest evidence (Oct 19, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 holding and 2 weakening.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The business only has attractive economics if AMBR’s services remain differentiated enough to earn fee or spread economics rather than being competed down to commodity execution pricing.
AMBR needs enough liquidity to fund the transition without distressed dilution, because persistent cash burn would transfer much of any future operating upside away from current holders.
Because AMBR operates in finance services, counterparty confidence is part of the product; the balance sheet must remain visibly solvent for customers to trust the platform.
Bear case: what the evidence questions
AMBR’s new finance-services positioning must restore customer relevance after the iClick revenue collapse; without a real customer pull for the Amber platform, the company remains subscale.
AMBR must turn its gross-profit pool into operating leverage; otherwise the public-company, compliance, technology, and personnel cost base consumes the economics of the platform.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Amber International Holding
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Amber International Holding filed an SEC report on 2026-10-14: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Amber International Holding filed an SEC report on 2026-09-28: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedForeign issuer material report (6-K).
Amber International Holding filed an SEC report on 2026-09-10: Foreign issuer material report (6-K). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Customers shift wallet to larger regulated banks, brokers, or crypto-native platforms instead of adopting AMBR’s finance-services offering.
- Large exchanges, brokers, or wealth platforms use scale to lower prices for execution, custody, or advisory services.
- Compliance, licensing, and technology spending rises faster than revenue as AMBR builds the new finance-services platform.
- Operating cash burn continues before revenue accelerates, forcing equity issuance or expensive financing.
- Trading, credit, custody, or counterparty losses reduce reported equity.
AMBR news
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Financial statements
AMBR income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
AMBR: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded AMBR?
- 1 trade in AMBR has been disclosed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President or senior officials, none in reports made public in the last 90 days. Every disclosed AMBR trade
