Asbury Automotive Group
ABGNYSEUSD
- Source valuation snapshot. Not a live recalculation.
- Latest filed annual earnings; price snapshot date unavailable. Not forward P/E.
- Diluted earnings per share from the latest filed annual.
- $206.38 Prior regular-session close from the quote source.
- $201.93–$207.94 Regular-session low and high so far today.
- 139.2K Regular-session shares traded · Nov 11, 4:00 PM ET.
- Not yet confirmed The company has not confirmed its next report date. Reported quarters are available in the chart’s Earnings view.
- $160.30–$258.75 52-week trading low and high returned by the quote source.
Understand the Business
Why the Stock Moved
Period-matched expectations history is not yet available. Current metrics are not a substitute for a historical explanation.
The core investment thesis
Own ABG if its franchised-dealer scale keeps capturing vehicle, service, financing and consolidation economics after pandemic-era auto margins normalize.
ABG price history
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Investment thesis
What must happen next
The franchised dealership model remains the required local channel for OEM vehicle sales and ownership support, so Asbury’s scale continues to convert auto demand and industry consolidation into sales.StrengtheningMateriality: High
FY2025 GAAP annual revenue was $18.0 billion, up from $17.2 billion in FY2024 and $14.8 billion in FY2023. If the franchise channel stays central, Asbury can keep growing with the market and acquisitions; if OEMs or customers bypass dealers, the core revenue engine weakens before margins recover.
Watch: Major OEM partners move meaningfully toward direct-to-consumer or agency pricing models that reduce dealer control over gross profit and F&I attachment.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual revenue was $18.0 billion, up from $17.2 billion in FY2024 and $14.8 billion in FY2023.
Open source ↗Recurring service work and finance-and-insurance attachment can cushion the normalization of new- and used-vehicle gross margins, keeping gross profit dollars resilient even when vehicle pricing becomes less favorable.HoldingMateriality: High
FY2025 GAAP annual gross profit was $3.07 billion, up from $2.95 billion in FY2024. This is the difference between Asbury being a pure cyclical vehicle-margin trade and a steadier dealership cash generator.
Watch: F&I regulators or lenders restrict dealer reserve, product pricing or add-on product sales, reducing attachment economics before gross profit dollars fall.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual gross profit was $3.07 billion, up from $2.95 billion in FY2024.
Open source ↗Asbury’s operating model can translate dealership scale into operating profit only if cost discipline and acquisition integration offset wage inflation, technology spend and lower vehicle front-end margins.HoldingMateriality: Medium
FY2025 GAAP annual operating income was $860.6 million, up from $835.6 million in FY2024. Revenue growth is not enough; owners need evidence that added volume is not being bought with structurally lower operating margins.
Watch: Acquired dealerships fail to reach expected productivity, creating higher SG&A without commensurate gross profit.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual operating income was $860.6 million, up from $835.6 million in FY2024.
Open source ↗The dealership model must keep converting earnings into operating cash despite inventory swings and floorplan financing, giving Asbury room to deleverage, repurchase shares or fund consolidation.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
FY2025 GAAP annual operating cash flow was $775.2 million, up from $671.2 million in FY2024 and $313.0 million in FY2023. Strong reported earnings matter less if working capital consumes cash; durable operating cash flow preserves strategic flexibility through the auto cycle.
Watch: OEMs overproduce or allocate the wrong mix, forcing Asbury to carry slower-turning inventory before income-statement pressure appears.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
FY2025 GAAP annual operating cash flow was $775.2 million, up from $671.2 million in FY2024 and $313.0 million in FY2023.
Open source ↗Asbury’s consolidation strategy remains value-creating only if cash earnings rebuild the equity cushion faster than acquisitions, inventory and financing needs add balance-sheet risk.StrengtheningMateriality: Medium
Stockholders’ equity rose to $3.89 billion at FY2025 year-end from $3.50 billion at FY2024 year-end and $3.24 billion at FY2023 year-end. A dealer roll-up can compound value when financed conservatively, but the same strategy can destroy equity if leverage is layered onto a cyclical margin downturn.
Watch: Credit markets tighten for auto retailers, limiting acquisition financing or raising refinancing costs before equity metrics deteriorate.
Supporting sources
Source notes are factual paraphrases; read the original disclosures below.
Stockholders’ equity rose to $3.89 billion at FY2025 year-end from $3.50 billion at FY2024 year-end and $3.24 billion at FY2023.
Open source ↗
Full investment case & evidence
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Original research
The franchised dealership model remains the required local channel for OEM vehicle sales and ownership support, so Asbury’s scale continues to convert auto demand and industry consolidation into sales. If the franchise channel stays central, Asbury can keep growing with the market and acquisitions; if OEMs or customers bypass dealers, the core revenue engine weakens before margins recover.
Recurring service work and finance-and-insurance attachment can cushion the normalization of new- and used-vehicle gross margins, keeping gross profit dollars resilient even when vehicle pricing becomes less favorable. This is the difference between Asbury being a pure cyclical vehicle-margin trade and a steadier dealership cash generator.
Asbury’s operating model can translate dealership scale into operating profit only if cost discipline and acquisition integration offset wage inflation, technology spend and lower vehicle front-end margins. Revenue growth is not enough; owners need evidence that added volume is not being bought with structurally lower operating margins.
The dealership model must keep converting earnings into operating cash despite inventory swings and floorplan financing, giving Asbury room to deleverage, repurchase shares or fund consolidation. Strong reported earnings matter less if working capital consumes cash; durable operating cash flow preserves strategic flexibility through the auto cycle.
Asbury’s consolidation strategy remains value-creating only if cash earnings rebuild the equity cushion faster than acquisitions, inventory and financing needs add balance-sheet risk. A dealer roll-up can compound value when financed conservatively, but the same strategy can destroy equity if leverage is layered onto a cyclical margin downturn.
All standing thesis claims
Original report summary
its franchised-dealer scale keeps capturing vehicle, service, financing and consolidation economics after pandemic-era auto margins normalize.
Bull case and bear case
Bull case and bear case for Asbury Automotive Group
Where the evidence on Asbury Automotive Group stands: Holding on the latest evidence (Oct 15, 2026). Of its 5 thesis points, 3 strengthening and 2 holding.
Bull case: what the evidence supports
The franchised dealership model remains the required local channel for OEM vehicle sales and ownership support, so Asbury’s scale continues to convert auto demand and industry consolidation into sales.
Recurring service work and finance-and-insurance attachment can cushion the normalization of new- and used-vehicle gross margins, keeping gross profit dollars resilient even when vehicle pricing becomes less favorable.
Asbury’s operating model can translate dealership scale into operating profit only if cost discipline and acquisition integration offset wage inflation, technology spend and lower vehicle front-end margins.
The dealership model must keep converting earnings into operating cash despite inventory swings and floorplan financing, giving Asbury room to deleverage, repurchase shares or fund consolidation.
Asbury’s consolidation strategy remains value-creating only if cash earnings rebuild the equity cushion faster than acquisitions, inventory and financing needs add balance-sheet risk.
Bear case: what would count against it
Major OEM partners move meaningfully toward direct-to-consumer or agency pricing models that reduce dealer control over gross profit and F&I attachment.
F&I regulators or lenders restrict dealer reserve, product pricing or add-on product sales, reducing attachment economics before gross profit dollars fall.
Acquired dealerships fail to reach expected productivity, creating higher SG&A without commensurate gross profit.
Thesis-Break Engine
Thesis-break watch · Asbury Automotive Group
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MARKET + FINANCIAL SNAPSHOT
The numbers behind the thesis
What Changed
- MixedRegulation FD disclosure.
Asbury Automotive Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-31: Regulation FD disclosure. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedDirector or principal officer change.
Asbury Automotive Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-08-25: Director or principal officer change. It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
- MixedReported results of operations (earnings release).
Asbury Automotive Group filed an SEC 8-K on 2026-07-28: Reported results of operations (earnings release). It is a dated development that tests the current thesis.
Risks / falsifiers
What could break the thesis
- Major OEM partners move meaningfully toward direct-to-consumer or agency pricing models that reduce dealer control over gross profit and F&I attachment.
- F&I regulators or lenders restrict dealer reserve, product pricing or add-on product sales, reducing attachment economics before gross profit dollars fall.
- Acquired dealerships fail to reach expected productivity, creating higher SG&A without commensurate gross profit.
- OEMs overproduce or allocate the wrong mix, forcing Asbury to carry slower-turning inventory before income-statement pressure appears.
- Credit markets tighten for auto retailers, limiting acquisition financing or raising refinancing costs before equity metrics deteriorate.
ABG news
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Financial statements
ABG income statement
Annual filed results · USD · Oldest to newest. Margins are calculated from the reported figures.
ABG: quick answers
- Have members of Congress traded ABG?
- Reports made public in the last 90 days disclose 1 trade in ABG by 1 filer: 1 purchase and 0 sales. They are filed under the STOCK Act by members of Congress, the President and senior officials. Every disclosed ABG trade
